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K. Y. Yong 
Lecturer in Civil Engineering, National University of Singapore, Singapore 
S. T. Ting 
Managing Director, Soil Investigation (Pte) Ltd, Singapore 
SYNOPSIS The results of an investigation carried out at a site before and after the slip failure 
of an embankment on soft marine clay are presented. An evaluation of the possible causes for the 
slip failure and the remedial measures taken after the failure are also included. It appears that 
overstressing of the ground might have led to the movement of the soft soil. The compressible 
soils were subjected to an increase in stress without a comparable increase in foundation shear 
strength. This increase in horizontal stress resulted in the horizontal displacement of the soil 
as evident by the presence of the tension cracks in the fill just before slip failure occurred. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 29, 1982, during the peak of 
construction activities on a site, its 
embankment slipped into the adjacent canal 
causing part of the canal walls to collapse. 
The construction site, separated from the canal 
by a 30 m wide drainage reserve, is for a 
proposed development of a vehicle depot with 
offices and workshops as shown in Fig. 1. All 
the buildings at the site are supported by 
piled foundations and are in various stages of 
construction when failure of the embankment 
occurred. Placement and compaction of fill for 
the vehicle parking area were also actively 
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indicated that the failure encompassed a length 
of about 100 m along the canal and extended 
across the drainage reserve to about 15 m into 
the construction site. Numerous tension cracks 
opened up in the fill soil on the site and 
drainage reserve. A pipeline, which runs 
parallel to the canal and supported by pad 
footings at about 10 m intervals, moved 
laterally by as much as a metre towards the 
canal at some locations before bursting at one 
point. It appears that overstressing of the 
ground due to the construction activities and 
placement of fill led to the movement of the 
soft soil. 
To prevent further movement of the slip and 
additional damage to the canal, the slope in 
the drainage reserve was regraded and about 
1.0 m of fill adjacent to the drainage reserve 
was removed by the site contractor. 
Construction activities also ceased in the 
vicinity of the drainage reserve boundary. 
SUBSOIL CONDITIONS 
Based on earlier site investigation, a typical 
section of the soil profile at the site is 
shown in Fig. 2. The subsoil consists 
generally of a top layer of fill deposits of 
medium stiff silty clay. Below this top layer 
is soft marine clay overlying medium dense to 
very dense clayey sand. Ground water-table 
observed from the boreholes was about 1.5 m to 
2. 5 m below the existing ground level at the 
site. 
From the soil information, it appears that the 
vehicle depot development is founded on soft 
.ground where the thickness of soft clay is 
typically about 10 m. The shear strength of 
this layer is so low that large settlement and 
low stability can be expected. 
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Fig. 2. Typical Soil Profile 
SLIP FAILURE OF EMBANKMENT 
The plan and typical sections of the site at 
various stages of events, before construction 
of the car park format ion to the removal of 
collapsed earth and regrading of slope, are 
illustrated in sequence in Fig. 3. Ground 
levels for various stages were measured by 
surveying techniques. 
To construct the parking area for vehicles, 
additional placement of fill was required for 
the whole site. It can be seen from Fig. 3(a) 
and (b) that an additional layer of fill of 
about 0.3 to 0.5 m was placed at the site. In 
addition, fill of about 2.85 m high was placed 
at the boundary of the site and drainage 
reserve, extending about 2 m from the toe of 
the original slope. Unfortunately, there was 
no available records to indicate the actual 
quantity and the rate of placement of fill 
except the fact that the fill placement and 
compaction began about two weeks prior to the 
day of failure. 
~ye-witnesses at the site indicated that 
tension cracks were observed on the fill on the 
norning of the day in which failure occurred. 
-!.aments after this observation, the pipeline 
burst resulting in water overflowing into the 
fill at the drainage reserve. This was 
followed subsequently by the slip failure and 
upheaval of the banks of the canal as shown in 
Fig. 3(c). Failure encompassed a length of 
about 100 m along the canal and extended across 
the drainage reserve to about 15 m into the 
construction site. The eye-witnesses further 
noted that failure took place suddenly with 
out any perceptible vibration. At the end 
of failure, settlement of the fill at the 
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Fig. 3. Sequence in Slip Failure of Embankment 
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boundary had reached over a metre, while the 
floor of the canal heaved close to a metre. 
The bin centre and vehicle washing shed, which 
are supported by tanalised timber piles showed 
no structural damage apart from some minor 
cracks in the floor slabs. The rest of the 
buildings, whic~ are supported on precast 
concrete piles, appeared to be unaffected by 
the slip failure. 
To prevent further movement of the slip and 
additional damage to the canal, construction 
activities ceased in the vicinity of the 
drainage reserve boundary and the collapsed 
soil was removed by the site contractor. The 
removal of the collapsed soil and the regrading 
of the slope shown in Fig. 3(d) was completed 
in five days. Although no records were 
available on the amount of earth removed, the 
site contractor estimated that about 480-lorry 
loads were involved. 
STABILITY ANALYSIS 
Five days after failure, six additional 
boreholes were carried out in the slipped 
area. The diameter of the boring was 15 0 mm 
and casings were used to prevent the collapsed 
of the soft clay and loose sand formation. In 
addition, vane shear tests were also con-
ducted. Results of the field and laboratory 
tests were consistent with the findings given 
in earlier soil reports. 
In establishing the reasons for the failure, 
factual evidence rules out a deep seated circu-
lar slip. The existence of a zone of very soft 
soil directly below the fill suggest a pre-
ferential plane of failure in this layer. 
Embankments on soft clay induce zones of over-
stressing. Elsewhere along the potential fail-
ure surface, stress levels can be sufficiently 
high that creep strains become important. 
Natural sedimented clays possess critical 
strain levels at which clay structure breaks 
down. This breakdown in clay generates the 
excess porewater pressure and a progressive 
undrained failure can occur rapidly (Bjerrum, 
1972). 
Stability analysis have been carried out con-
sidering critical circles using total stress 
analysis. The approach to stability analyses 
are by the method of slices and the design 
charts given in Navfac DM-7 (1982) • Results of 
the analyses are summarised in Fig. 4. The 
standard slip circle analysis, using undrained 
shear strength calculated from results of 
triaxial test and vane tests, is adequate for 
the prevailing site conditions. In the 
analyses, the following conditions and assump-
tions were made: 




surcharge is applied rapidly on 
stratum where no provision is 
drain porewater during stress 
(ii) The vane shear strength is corrected for 
anisotropic conditions and strain rate 
(Bjerrum, 1972). 
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(iii) Soil parameters used 
analysis are based on 
condition. 
in the stability 
minimum strength 
It can be seen from the results that the 
critical slip failure passes through the soft 
clay stratum giving factors of safety ranging 
from 0.91 to 1.21. This circle is in good 
agreement with the exterior signs of failure. 
Method of Shear St2ength Factor of 
Analysis (kN/m ) Safety 
Method of slices 8 (Undrained 0.91 
Triaxial) 
Method of slices 10 (Vane Shear 1.21 
Test) 
Navfac DM-7 (1971) 8 (Undrained 1.02 
Triaxial) 
Before Fa i 1 ure 
------------~~--~~------------~14.0 
---------------+------------------------~20.0 
Critical Slip Failure 
Scale: 1:750 
Fig. 4. Results of Slope Stability Analyses 
POSSIBLE CAUSES OF FAILURE 
In examining the possible causes of failure, it 
is worth noting that it is difficult to 
reconstruct the actual sequence of events that 
led to failure; thus factors which initiated 
the instability seldom can be positively 
identified. However, based on field observa-
tions and information provided by the site 
contractor and engineer, the events leading to 
failure can be postulated. 
During the initial placement of about 5 m of 
fill on the marine clay, 12 months before the 
present contractor moved in, no sub-surface 
drainage was installed to dissipate the excess 
porewa ter pressure generated. Furthermore, no 
piezometers were installed to monitor the 
change in porewater pressure in the 10 m thick 
marine clay. The high water-table in the fill 
observed at the site may indicate the presence 
of excess porewater pressure. Therefore, when 
the site was possessed by the present contra·c-
tor, there was no information to indicate the 
effective stress condition of the subsoil. The 
construction activities at the site and the 
placement of the additional fill at the 
boundary of the drainage reserve might have 
triggered the failure in view of the marginal 
factor of safety for slope stability. 
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Therefore, it appears that overstressing of the 
ground might have led to the movement of the 
soil. The compressible soils were subjected to 
an increase in stress without a comparable 
increase in foundation shear strength. The 
increase in horizontal stress would result in 
horizontal displacement of the soil. This was 
evident in the tension cracks in the fill 
before slip failure occurred. In fact, the 
tension cracks were a warning sign of impending 
instability. 
The lateral movement of the ground resulted in 
the pipeline bursting at one of the joints. 
Although the control valves of the pipeline was 
turned off 20 minutes after the bursting, the 
water from the pipeline had overflowed and 
seeped into the fill and this undoubtedly 
increased the lateral stress on the walls and 
floor of the canal. Collapsed of the walls and 
heaving of the floor of the canal occurred soon 
after as a result of increased soil and hydro-
static pressure. 
REMEDIAL MEASURES AND PRECAUTIONS 
Remedial measures were required as soon as 
possible to prevent any further movement. 
Survey measurements taken at the site regularly 
after failure indicated that ground movements 
towards the canal was still in progress 
although at a smaller magnitude. It was feared 
that these movements might increase during 
period of heavy rainfall or increase site 
activities. 
The use of counter-berm to stabilise the 
movement was not possible because of its 
proximity to the canal. As an expedient 
measure, the slope was regraded gently to 1:8 
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as shown in Fig. 3(d) and excess soil 
removed to relieve some of the stresses or 
soft marine clay. Inclinometers were r• 
mended to be installed at the drainage re: 
to monitor any ground movements during : 
regrading and the subsequent repair of 
canal. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The stability analysis given in this pape 
by no means comprehensive. Original g1 
conditions were irreparably altered. HowE 
from field tests and observations, it apJ 
that overstressing of the ground caused 
sudden failure with rapid soil displacer 
Tension cracks in the fill are signif: 
indication of initial ground movement and 
of impending failure. In view of the 
foundation soil at the site, some instrumE 
tion such as inclinometers and piezomE 
should have been installed before constru< 
commenced at the site. Readings from 1 
devices would have forewarn any imper 
instability in the soil. 
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